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The relationship between science and
the philosophy of science is likely to be
judged a contested one. Certainly many
philosophical debates may seem oblique to
the uninitiated (and even then, perhaps
still!), whilst recent intellectual debacles
have tended to portray philosophers of
science in a poor light. During the 1990s,
for example, the ‘‘Science Wars’’ erupted
over the question of whether scientific
theories provided true, objective descrip-
tions of reality, or whether they were
simply arbitrary ‘‘constructions,’’ mere
mythologies on a par with ancient Greek
theogony or medieval magic [1]. There is
some truth to such charges, some of it
certainly attributable to an unhealthy
certain intoxication with trendy theories
(like ‘‘relativism’’ and ‘‘constructionism’’).
Yet even if those charges are not always
justified, and even if the majority of the
philosophy of science is informed and
responsible, it remains true that philoso-
phers of science who pitch into debates
about the sciences beyond their own
professional boundaries must take extra
care before letting loose their ideas.
With that proviso in mind, the title of
Paul Feyerabend’s book, The Tyranny of
Science, should set off alarm bells, especially
since the cover of the book depicts blood-
red atomic bombs falling from above onto
a desolate city. Indeed, the author himself,
who was professor of philosophy at
Berkeley and Zurich until his death in
1993, has a ‘‘bad reputation’’ both within
and beyond the philosophy of science.
Feyerabend was famously dubbed ‘‘the
worst enemy of science’’ by Science, and
even today philosophers of science will
tend to associate his name with anti-
science polemics, defences of voodoo and
astrology, and more besides [2].
Fortunately, Feyerabend is far more
sensible than the title and cover of this
book and his bad reputation suggest.
Although he is reputed as a critic of
science, he is not. Feyerabend is critical
not of science itself, but of false and
misleading images of the sciences. The
‘‘tyranny’’ of the title refers not to an
encroaching and disenchanting ‘‘scientific
worldview,’’ of the sort popular with some
cultural critics, but with the dangers which
arose when people fail to understand and
appreciate science. Back in the 1960s and
early 1970s, Feyerabend urged philoso-
phers of science to take seriously both the
history of science and scientific practice—
he was a trained physicist himself—and
warned his peers that mere abstract
reflection on the sciences would produce
only idealised fantasies of science, rather
than workable models of it. Although
subsequent generations of philosophers of
science took him seriously, many at the
time took his claim as a personal attack—
hence the ‘‘bad reputation.’’
Into the 1980s, Feyerabend began to
expand the scope of his ideas. By the
beginning of the 1980s, the philosophy of
science was a richer discipline, so Feyer-
abend moved onto new issues. It struck
him that public confidence in the sciences
was beginning to change into the 1980s.
The nuclear accidents at Chernobyl and
Three Mile Island, waning interest in the
space program, and ambitious new claims
on behalf of genetics were beginning to
affect public faith in the sciences. Feyer-
abend was not opposed to such public
doubts, but he did worry that the public
concerns, although sincere, were too often
ill-informed. Worse still, those worries
were often amplified by overzealous phi-
losophers who, to his mind, were failing in
their job of clarifying concepts, scrutinising
arguments, and helping people to articu-
late and develop their ideas. By the late
1980s, Feyerabend began to take special
issue with philosophers who actively en-
couraged such confusions, for instance
by announcing that electrons and genes
were mere ‘‘social constructions,’’ or by
rebranding forms of relativism, or by im-
plicating ‘‘Western Science’’ in a powerful
conspiracy to disempower indigenous cul-
tures—indeed, Feyerabend himself suc-
cumbed to such alluring polemics for a
time, which partly explains his hostile
reaction to them later in his career [3].
Feyerabend’s issues with public concerns
about science and his worries about philos-
ophers’ role in the subsequent debates laid
the foundations for the lectures that became
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of that lecture series was Conflict and Harmony,
which is a much better title because it
indicates that public engagement with
Feyerabend P (2011) The Tyranny of
Science. Oberheim E, editor. Cam-
bridge: Polity Press. 180 p. ISBN-13:
978-0745651897 (hardcover). US$54.95
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001166.g001
Citation: Kidd IJ (2011) Rethinking Feyerabend: The ‘‘Worst Enemy of Science’’? PLoS Biol 9(10): e1001166.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001166
Published October 4, 2011
Copyright:  2011 Ian James Kidd. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: No funding was received for this article.
Competing Interests: The author has declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: i.j.kidd@durham.ac.uk
PLoS Biology | www.plosbiology.org 1 October 2011 | Volume 9 | Issue 10 | e1001166science is dynamic and complex—periods of
‘‘conflict’’ and ‘‘harmony,’’ with scientists,
policymakers, philosophers, and other in-
volved groups trying to balance the tensions.
Feyerabend’s claim here is that many of the
conflicts concerning science are based upon
confusions about and misperceptions of
science—for example, the idea that science
is ‘‘value-free.’’ That claim clearly cannot be
true, if only because science is necessarily
motivated by cognitive and practical values,
yet it still features within public and policy
debates. Feyerabend’s aim in these lectures
was to try to demonstrate the science is
much more complex than people tend to
imagine, and that our thinking about it must
be correspondingly complex if we are to
make sense of it. Science is only a ‘‘tyrant’’ if
we fail to do it justice, and attribute to it
exalted characteristics—such as ‘‘value-neu-
trality’’ or isolation from society—which it
lacks.
Throughout his career, Feyerabend
defended the claim that there is, in fact,
no one thing called ‘‘Science,’’ where that
term is understood to refer to something
singular and formalised, with uniformly
shared methods, theories, and concepts
[4]. ‘‘Science’’ as so defined does not exist,
even though the idea of it is a powerful
one. In its place, urged Feyerabend, we
should think and talk about multiple
sciences—diverse in their methods and
aims, held together by some common
values perhaps, but otherwise more an
aggregate than the monolith that some
writers presume. In order to bring about
this reconception of philosophy, Feyera-
bend urged us to reach out to all the
resources at our disposal, a fact evidenced
in the eclecticism and immense learning
obvious in Tyranny. Feyerabend leaps from
contemporary social events to the history
of geometry, ancient Greek poetry to
modern biology, and from the arts to
philosophy. The purpose of such intellec-
tual pyrotechnics is not simply to enter-
tain, but to demonstrate just how richly
and powerfully the sciences are interlinked
with modern human life. For Feyerabend,
understanding and appreciation should
come as a pair so that, by the end of the
lectures, the sciences cease to be the
tyrants which contemporary concerns
suggest they may be, and which some
critics insist they must be.
A key example of the sorts of public
worries about science that Feyerabend had
in mind concerns genetics. Although hu-
man genetic research is conceded to afford
wonderful possibilities—for medicine and
agriculture, say—there are also corre-
sponding concerns about the abuse of those
powers. In the UK, there is a common
rhetoric in the popular press concerning
‘‘designer babies,’’ GM crops, ‘‘astrological
genetics,’’ and a host of other concerns,
each centring upon an implicit worry that
the powers of genetic science are too
dangerous to be controlled, or that they
will be abused. Despite consistent assur-
ances, for instance on the part of the British
Government, that genetic research is in-
tensely regulated, public doubts persist.
Indeed, the very fact that such doubts exist
may frustrate researchers who consider
their work to be both morally scrupulous
and ofclear cognitiveandpracticalvalue.It
may be difficult for those researchers to
make willing concessions to public doubts
where those doubts are regarded not only
as ill-founded, but also as likely to result in
further unduly onerous regulation, or even
the termination of research projects.
Feyerabend sees a role for philosophers
to contribute here. Many worries about
genetic research rely upon inarticulate
moral or aesthetic concerns—the so-called
‘‘yuk factor’’ which arises at the sight of
‘‘Frankenstein’’ organisms like the famous
OncoMouse. In such cases, philosophers
can help the public to articulate those
concerns and to refine them through
argumentation [5]. Often, the worries
dissolve upon analysis, and sometimes, of
course, are reinforced, but in each case,
progress is being made. Feyerabend there-
fore stressed the need for scientific literacy,
philosophical competence, and historical
awareness as essential components of
informed public engagement with science.
Of course, philosophers do not assume a
guiding role here; Feyerabend was no fan
of the pretensions of some philosophers to
resume their ancient, privileged position,
but he did consider that their critical
sensibilities could be valuable to those
wider debates. And since public concerns
about the sciences invoke not only scien-
tific facts, but also philosophical judge-
ments about value, purpose, and meaning
(the idea of the ‘‘sanctity of life,’’ for
instance, demands philosophical input, if
only because most of the persons who
invoke it are not generally after a biolog-
ical formulation of it). As long as philos-
ophers remain informed about the scienc-
es they engage with, they can be valuable
aids to the project of facilitating public
engagement with science—and today, few
sciences arouse more fascination, hope,
and alarm than the biological sciences [6].
Feyerabend clearly sets himself a broad
remit and an ambitious aim. Public concern
with the sciences is a persistent and perhaps
increasing feature of modern societies. For
sure, some of that concern is justified, but
much of it is not, for instance because it rests
upon false ideas, misperceptions of the
science, or because the public imagination
has been warped by charged rhetoric and
imagery. Feyerabend regretted such misun-
derstandings and thought that philosophers
had an important role to play in helping the
public make sense of its concerns. If that
sounds paternalistic, it should not—for one
thing, philosophers often share those same
worries, and for another, philosophers can
lay legitimate claim to intellectual skills well-
suited to the task of making sense of
concerns of science. Feyerabend does not
propose that philosophers will pontificate to
the public, because he was alert to the fact
that philosophers can become ‘‘tyrannous’’
if they, too, cease being engaged with, and
responsive to, the concerns and curiosities of
the public.
The Tyranny of Science should therefore be
interpreted as Feyerabend’s attempts to
dissolve conflicts and establish harmony
between science, society, and philosophy,
on the one hand, and between scientists,
philosophers, and the public, on the other.
The concerns and alarms that concerned
Feyerabend are not the exclusive preserve of
any of those domains—scientific, public, or
philosophical—and to properly understand
and address them each must cooperate with
the other. Tyranny only arises when one of
those would try to dominate the others, and
Feyerabend’s book offers an engaging and
entertaining case against such tyranny.
Editors’ note: Does the cultural
divide between science and the humani-
ties, first articulated by C. P. Snow over 50
years ago, still exist between biology and
philosophy? In a mini experiment to find
out, we asked a philosopher and biologist
to review the recent English translation of
Tyranny of Science, by 20th century philos-
opher Paul Feyerabend, perhaps best
known for rejecting the claim that science
is a singular discipline unified by common
methods and concepts.
About the Author
Ian James Kidd is a Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Durham and works
mainly in the history and philosophy of science. His recent research explores the
role of contingency, pluralism, and epistemic virtues in scientific enquiry and has
been published in a range of journals in the philosophy of science. Further
information can be found on his website at http://www.dur.ac.uk/i.j.kidd/.
PLoS Biology | www.plosbiology.org 2 October 2011 | Volume 9 | Issue 10 | e1001166References
1. Gould SJ (2000) Deconstructing the ‘‘science
wars’’ by reconstructing an old mold. Science
287: 253–261.
2. Preston J, Mune ´var G, Lamb D (2000) The worst
enemy of science: essays in memory of Paul
Feyerabend. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
3. Feyerabend P (1987) Farewell to reason. London:
Verso.
4. Feyerabend P (1993) Against method. Third
edition. London: Verso.
5. Midgley M (2001) Science and poetry. London:
Routledge.
6. Barnes B, Dupre ´ J (2008) Genomes and what to
make of them. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
PLoS Biology | www.plosbiology.org 3 October 2011 | Volume 9 | Issue 10 | e1001166